

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO  
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vs.

Criminal Action 2:09-cr-260  
JUDGE MICHAEL H. WATSON

ARMONDO LEONARDO MONTEZ

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The United States and defendant Armondo Leonardo Montez entered into a plea agreement, executed under the provisions of Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, whereby defendant agreed to enter a plea of guilty to Counts 1 and 2 of the *Superseding Information*, which charges him with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1) and possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (Count 2).<sup>1</sup> On October 7, 2020, defendant, assisted by a Spanish interpreter and his counsel, participated in an arraignment and entry of guilty plea proceeding.

After being advised of his right to appear personally and with his counsel and after consulting with his counsel, defendant consented to appear by videoconference.

Defendant also waived his right to an indictment in open court and after being advised of the nature of the charges and of his rights. See Fed. R. Crim P. 7(b). While in open court, defendant authorized his counsel to execute a written waiver of indictment on

---

<sup>1</sup> In addition to specifying sentencing terms, the *Plea Agreement*, ECF No. 294, includes an appellate waiver provision that preserves only certain claims for appeal. Although the *Plea Agreement* specifies a special assessment of \$100, the parties agree that a special assessment of \$200 will be required. The *Plea Agreement* does not refer to possible immigration consequences of defendant's guilty plea. However, defendant, who is a citizen of Mexico and not a citizen of the United States, acknowledged at the arraignment the likely immigration consequences of his plea.

defendant's behalf. Counsel will promptly file that executed written waiver.

Defendant consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(3), to enter a guilty plea before a Magistrate Judge. See *United States v. Cukaj*, 25 Fed. Appx. 290, 291(6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001)(Magistrate Judge may accept a guilty plea with the express consent of the defendant and where no objection to the report and recommendation is filed).

During the plea proceeding, the undersigned observed the appearance and responsiveness of defendant in answering questions. Based on that observation, the undersigned is satisfied that, at the time he entered his guilty plea, defendant was in full possession of his faculties, was not suffering from any apparent physical or mental illness, and was not under the influence of narcotics, other drugs, or alcohol.

Prior to accepting defendant's plea, the undersigned addressed defendant personally and in open court and determined his competence to plead. Based on the observations of the undersigned, defendant understands the nature and meaning of the charges in the *Superseding Information* and the consequences of the plea of guilty to those charges. Defendant was also addressed personally and in open court and advised of each of the rights referred to in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Having engaged in the colloquy required by Rule 11, the Court concludes that defendant's plea is voluntary. Defendant acknowledged that the plea agreement signed by him, his attorney and the attorney for the United States and filed on September 9, 2020, represents the only promises made by anyone regarding the charges in the *Superseding Information*. Defendant was advised that the District Judge may accept or reject the plea agreement. Defendant was further advised that, if the Court refuses to accept the plea agreement, defendant will have the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea but that, if he does not withdraw his guilty plea under those circumstances, the District Judge

may impose a sentence that is more severe than the sentence contemplated in the plea agreement, up to the statutory maximum.

Defendant confirmed the accuracy of the statement of facts supporting the charges, which is attached to the *Plea Agreement*. He confirmed that he is pleading guilty to Counts 1 and 2 of the *Superseding Information* because he is in fact guilty of those offenses. The Court concludes that there is a factual basis for the plea.

The Court concludes that defendant's plea of guilty to Counts 1 and 2 of the *Superseding Information* is knowingly and voluntarily made with understanding of the nature and meaning of the charges and of the consequences of the plea.

It is therefore **RECOMMENDED** that defendant's guilty plea to Counts 1 and 2 of the *Superseding Information* be accepted. Decision on acceptance or rejection of the plea agreement was deferred for consideration by the District Judge after the preparation of a presentence investigation report.

In accordance with S.D. Ohio Crim. R. 32.1, and as expressly agreed to by defendant through counsel, a written presentence investigation report will be prepared by the United States Probation Office. Defendant will be asked to provide information; defendant's attorney may be present if defendant so wishes. Objections to the presentence report must be made in accordance with the rules of this Court.

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this *Report and Recommendation*, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the *Report and Recommendation*, specifically designating this *Report and Recommendation*, and the part thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); F.R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections must be

filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. F.R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the *Report and Recommendation* will result in a waiver of the right to *de novo* review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the *Report and Recommendation*. See *United States v. Wandahsega*, 924 F.3d 868, 878 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2019); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).

October 7, 2020  
Date

s/ Norah McCann King  
Norah McCann King  
United States Magistrate Judge